Monday, August 11, 2008

Twenty First Century Realpolitik

Otto von Bismark used to quip that foreign policy should not be chained by the cumbersome constructs of ideology and morality. He believed in ruthless pursuit of foreign goals through any means possible. He was, in essence, a poster child for Machiavelli. And as a result, he led Germany to continental dominance in the mid to late 19th century.

Contrast this with the current Republican administration which relies heavily on the neoconservative school of governance. The Bush White House has dramatically shifted the foreign policy paradigm of their party to the other side. They are idealists. They believe in good vs. evil, and right vs. wrong. They split the world into "good" democracies and an Axis of Evil. Idealists fore go practical considerations in favor of value considerations (see Iraq War). This is a sharp break from the Republican tradition of Kissinger, Reagan, and elder Bush who conducted foreign policy based on cold calculation and protection of interests.

But now we have an old enemy turned new ally playing the geopolitical game of the 19th century. By retaliating against Georgian aggression in South Ossetia and pushing their forces into Georgia proper, the Russians are displaying the sort of Machiavellan intuition that led to the rise of Germany in the late 19th century.

Will they be the next troublesome world power? Probably not. But then again, Germany grew in a world utterly dominated by Great Britain, so there's no definite answer to that question.

However, we can draw certain historical parallels and place them in modern context to accurately judge how the United States should approach the problem of a more assertive Russia.

Honestly, it was only a matter of time before Russian petrodollars translated into military force. Many political scientists have recently started comparing post Soviet Russia to the Weimar Republic of the interwar years. Both nations had a shattered economy and a population that heavily resented the fall of their respective empires. Both nations then saw an authoritarian leader take power under the guise of democracy and lead them to economic prominence. It doesn't matter that Russia was more fortunate than Germany because of the high price of oil, all that matters for this comparison is that both nations rose to economic prominence seemingly out of nowhere.

What is even more interesting is that the invasion of Georgia parallels the Nazi takeover of Danzig and the Sudentenland. Hitler justified his actions by saying that he was merely protecting German peoples from prosecution in those areas. Sound familiar? The Russian autocracy's main justification for the use of force was that Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia were killed by Georgian aggression.

A bigger concern is that the citizens of South Ossetia and the breakaway Georgian province of Abkhazia hold Russian passports. Therefore any attack on them could provide a just war justification for the Russians. Sure that may give the Russians justification to drive the Georgians out of those regions, but not to push further into Georgia proper.

However, we're not dealing with a government that bases its decisions on morality. We are dealing with a government that sees the world through the eyes of 19th century power politics and realpolitik. The Russians saw their chance to put an end to a country that has been a thorn it their side for some time now. After this disastrous altercation, there is very little chance that NATO or the EU would risk granting Georgia full membership.

Mission accomplished.

But no. The Russians seemingly want to go further and topple the current democratic regime, not just prevent it from joining the EU and NATO.

So what is the West to do?

Traditionally, negotiating with a power that plays realpolitik and uses force to do so has been considered appeasement. Neville Chamberlain anyone?

Up to this point, the United States and EU have played a pretty even hand with Russia. They have diffused any potential situations be using diplomacy and cunning to keep the Russians content; mainly because they think they need Russian support on a host of world issues ranging from Iran to nuclear non-proliferation. However, this is probably one situation were diplomacy and carrots won't be as effective as some version of the stick.

However, is war with Russia an option?

The EU won't risk its short term energy future to fight Russia over Georgia.

The United States won't risk opening another front for its already battle fatigued forces.

However, the Western allies have to play a little power politics themselves to force Russia to stand down. The Russians currently have everything in their favor. Georgia is a small nation in the center of the Oil Road. It does not have any strategic allies in the region and cannot count on Western forces to aid it effectively due to geographical isolation. Soft power won't be enough to deter Russia.

All of this is setting a dangerous precedent for the region. If Russia can have its way with a neighboring country and effect regime change by brute force, then what's to stop her from pursuing that strategy in other nations. The Baltic states and Ukraine have the most to lose here. They are not only democratic institutions on the path towards EU membership, but also have been outspoken critics of Putin's administration. They have, so far, been an effective check on the territorial ambitions of the Russians. However, depending on how this war ends, they may become more timid in their accusations in the near future.

More important is the effect this aggression may have on the Russian political psyche. They have outmaneuvered the West completely in this conflict. We cannot do anything but sit, watch, and hope Moscow signs some sort of cease fire agreement. By not being able to pursue a military option, NATO has effectively been neutered in the Caucuses area and the United States' military limits have been exposed.

Most importantly, the Russians know that the West is unwilling to challenge them militarily or isolate them diplomatically.

So what is the solution to this mess?

Only time can tell.

One option includes extending NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine as a deterrent to future Russian aggression. Russia would not dare attack a NATO member and incur the wrath of the entire alliance. And they would have the security of knowing that NATO could not launch a preemptive strike. After all, where would NATO member states get their oil from?

Another option includes defending the right of Georgia to exist. This means that the United States defend the the capital, Tbilisi and force the Russians to make a decision: either turn back or find themselves in open conflict with the United States.

Both of these paths pretty much pave the way for another Cold War. But if Russia favors becoming a 19th century power player over a 21st century global moderator, then there are very few options.

There are a few reasons diplomacy won't work in this situation. First, the Russians really don't offer the West much in the way of being effective world leaders. They've continually refused to place santions on Iran and even provide them with nuclear materials. They also refuse to impose any sort of incursion into Sudan to prevent the genocide in Darfur. So what do we bargain for? Apparently the status quo, and that's not much of a chip. Second, as explained above, the Russians have all the leverage in the situation and no incentive to negotiate.

Whatever happens though, one thing is certain: Russia has finally asserted itself in a manner that we thought extinct. They have resurrected the power politics of the 19th and 20th centuries that many pundits and experts thought long dead. We might be on the verge of witnessing the dangerous rise of twenty first century realpolitik from a nation that has once again found power and is eager to use it.

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